
Team Blair seem to have their paws into everything unsavoury at the moment. Tony Blair’s old ID card obsession is back, rebranded as a digital ID 'modernisation' project. The Tony Blair Institute is lobbying hard for a national digital identity spine, pitched as efficient, secure, and inevitable, while his son Euan Blair’s ed-tech firm Multiverse builds HR and upskilling platforms that profile, score, and track workers at scale. Put together, you have a truly worst case scenario: a state-issued ID system seamlessly feeding corporate analytics pipelines. Supporters claim it’s safer and more convenient, but critics warn it’s a hacking honeypot, a soft-mandated 'Britcard' for work eligibility, and a gateway to mission creep: rent, healthcare, even voting. Irrespective of Multiverse's level of 'involvement', in the ID scheme, Multiverse’s dashboards, skills diagnostics, and algorithmic recruitment tools show exactly how such IDs could be exploited in the workplace. The danger isn’t conspiracy but architecture: once the spine exists, corporations and the state will use it to lock people into profiles they cannot contest.
Twenty-five years ago, Tony Blair tried to force through the Identity Cards Act: a centralised ID scheme with a National Identity Register hoovering up citizens’ details. Parliament passed it in 2006; the coalition government repealed it in 2010 and destroyed the database in 2011 after a public backlash that saw the scheme branded intrusive, costly, and authoritarian. Wikipedia
A generation later, the same political lineage is back under new packaging. Tony Blair now fronts a well-funded campaign for digital ID, insisting that the old fears are outdated and the technology is safer, cheaper, and more convenient. His think-tank, the Tony Blair Institute (TBI), has spent the past few years pushing a new consensus for state digital identity, touting polling that claims majority support. The pitch is familiar: cut fraud, curb illegal work, speed up government services, modernise Britain. Tony Blair Institute
In parallel, Euan Blair, Tony Blair’s son, runs Multiverse, a venture-backed upskilling company that is already handling Government contracts. Multiverse have not been given the contract to design the Digital ID platform and the level of involvement of Multiverse in the TBI pushed scheme is open to interpretation, but it seem inconceivable that there has been no discussions between the two groups, given that Multiverse already operate in the public sector in exactly the kind of modular interface the digital ID requires. It's a dystopian nightmare that promises employers measurable productivity gains by diagnosing skills gaps, training workers in data/AI, and tracking learning outcomes on its platform, and god forbid if you fall between the algorithms. Multiverse gives dashboards, diagnostics, and data: it boasts business impact you can measure and a skills gap diagnostic that assesses employee capabilities and progress. It is, explicitly, a system for profiling and quantifying workers at scale, exactly what digital ID would need. Multiverse
Put those two tracks together, the father’s public push for a national digital identity spine and the son’s private platform for datafying the workforce and you have a dystopian roadmap for the future: the re-emergence of an ID state, only now plugged into corporate talent pipelines, algorithmic scoring, and skills passports.
The fact is that whoever is involved in this this, it is a really bad idea, but Blair involvement takes the piss to a new level.

Defenders of digital ID say the 2000s debate is ancient history. Today we already live with 'soft IDs': phone numbers, device fingerprints, bank logins, travel cards, NHS apps, school records, and CCTV all stitched together by advertisers and analytics firms. A digital ID, they argue, simply rationalises the chaos and makes everything more secure. The TBI’s latest paper frames digital ID as a pragmatic upgrade to reduce fraud, speed up services, and tackle illegal work, while public-opinion data is presented as proof that the country is ready. Tony Blair Institute
That’s exactly why a state-backed digital ID is more dangerous now. In 2006, the ID card was a single database risk. In 2025, a government ID becomes the integration point: the spine that can link together multiple public and private datasets, with powerful incentives to make participation de facto mandatory. When you unify identity, you lower the transaction costs of cross-referencing everything else. That is not paranoia; it’s the centre of the current UK debate. The government is advancing a UK digital identity and attributes trust framework to standardise how organisations exchange verified identity attributes. It envisions schemes in which many organisations agree to common rules for sharing and certifying digital IDs and attributes, precisely the kind of plumbing that lets state and corporate systems interoperate. GOV.UK
And while ministers talk up convenience, security experts and civil liberties groups are warning, again, about centralised risk and mission creep. Over the last 48 hours alone, reporting has highlighted plans for a UK digital ID (Britcard) carried on phones, mandatory for work eligibility checks, and possibly extended across services, with critics calling it an enormous hacking target and a road to a papers-please society. Even supportive ministers have admitted there are hacking risks.

If you want a concrete picture of how a digital ID would intersect with the workplace, look at what Multiverse sells to employers right now.

None of this is illegal or even unusual in modern ed-tech. And that is kind of the point. The normalisation of always-on metrics and algorithmic scoring creates the conditions where a national digital ID, sold as a neutral wallet or attribute store can be plugged into existing corporate assessment pipelines with minimal friction. A verified identity bound to verified credentials and training history is a dream for HR analytics and a nightmare for citizens’ ability to escape past labels and machine-generated inferences.
When politicians and think-tanks tout digital ID, where is the due diligence on conflicts of interest and the political economy of data?
Even if Digital ID was introduced. Multiverse should be nowhere near it. Multiverse’s growth story has been rocky but well capitalised: a unicorn valuation of $220m in 2022; rapid US expansion; layoffs and retrenchment as revenues lagged; losses climbing to ~£60m in the year to March 2024 even as turnover rose. Through it all, Euan Blair’s personal wealth suggests the equity story remains intact. None of this is criminal; it’s the venture treadmill. But it tells you the business incentives: growth demands more data, more users, more integrations and a national digital ID regime lowers customer acquisition and verification frictions across the board. Tracxn
The firm also acquired an AI company (Searchlight) to bolster its analytics engine and margins, exactly the move you’d expect from a platform leaning deeper into algorithmic talent scoring and prediction. Again: not an accusation but a clear datapoint about direction of travel. The Times
Tony Blair’s renewed advocacy for digital IDs isn’t coy. He’s on the record urging their introduction as part of a wider tech-led reform programme, and in 2025 his institute released yet another paper arguing the UK is ready. The mainstream press is covering the impending UK plans, complete with timelines, wallet apps, Britcard branding, and the assertion (from ministers) that breaches are a risk we must stomach. That the former PM who tried physical IDs is now the think-tanker for digital IDs is not incidental. It’s the through-line. The Times
Here’s the uncomfortable symmetry:
Call it modernisation if you like but from the vantage of civil liberties, it is a hereditary revolving door between state power and corporate data extraction. The state issues and gradually mandates and corporate partners monetise the flows. The human being sits in the middle, simplified into attributes, scores, and risk flags.
https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/britcard-digital-id-161957320.html

Proponents insist that digital ID will reduce risk by replacing a messy patchwork of identifiers. The problem is not cryptography; it’s governance. The UK’s trust framework contemplates multi-organisation schemes that share and certify attributes. That’s fine on paper. In practice, breach and misuse risk scales with the number of integrations and the incentives to expand use-cases. Even The Guardian’s neutral coverage stresses the 'enormous hacking target' problem; ministers waving that away with embrace the risk is not a safeguard. GOV.UK
Algorithmic decision-making layered on top of verified IDs raises separate risks. The recruitment industry is already wrestling with bias, opacity, and data protection obligations when using AI for hiring and progression. Tie those systems to a state-verified identity and you amplify harms: the wrong label sticks harder, the model’s error is harder to challenge, and exit routes close. Mitratech

The Blair line is: the world has changed; digital ID is overdue. Our line should be: the world has changed, and that’s why digital ID is more dangerous now. In a country where employers, insurers, landlords, and government departments already run behavioural data through proprietary models, a state ID becomes the universal adapter. It doesn’t just help you log in; it helps others lock you in to profiles you can’t see and decisions you can’t contest. You don’t need a conspiracy to see the shape of the thing. You need only look at the father’s advocacy and the son’s product:
This is not an argument about personalities; it’s a warning about architecture. The personalities involved are just a big red flag we should all be taking notice of. If you build a national identity spine in 2025, it will be spliced into corporate analytics stacks by 2026. If you mandate it for work eligibility in 2027, it will be required for a dozen other gateways by 2029. And if you let that happen without ironclad limits and transparent governance, you will have created the most powerful instrument of social sorting this country has ever seen. If ministers want trust, start with hard guarantees: no centralised registers; no function creep beyond specified use-cases; strict purpose limitation; adversarial security testing; independent audits; statutory rights to human review; and a bright-line firewall between state IDs and private scoring models.
Where is gets really sinister is when you add money into the mix. Project Rosalind, the Bank of England’s trial for programmable payments. [disucussed by this Blog on 19th May] Here is where is gets really dark as this lays the framework for fusing identity and currency. Link ID to eligibility and payments, and the state no longer just checks who you are, it controls what you can do. Access to wages or benefits could be switched off with the flick of a policy toggle; 'smart' money could be restricted to approved purchases; private scoring models could mine ID-linked histories until surveillance capitalism and state surveillance blur into one. By tying this ID spine to Rosalind, and by market inevitability you are staring at the skeleton of a managed personal credit system, not a conspiracy, but a project that is currently being quietly prototyped by the Bank of England and its corporate partners. Without strict guarantees, no central registers, no function creep, statutory human review, and a hard firewall between state IDs and private scoring: For years credit referencing had acted as boot on the throat holding back the less well off from pulling themselves out of poverty. That wasn't it's intention, it was just designed in a way that this became an unintended consequence. With Project Rosalind sitting over the ID frameworks, this time it is deliberately being embedded. We need to talk about Project Rosalind
This Britain risks sleepwalking into Kafka with a Mastercard logo.Until then, the only sensible position is the one the public arrived at last time: no, thanks. Big Brother Watch
And the Blairs have their paws all over it.
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